Abstract. The purpose of this study is to present the notion of mercenaries laid down in literature and in international law, as its applicability to private military companies and their employees so. The fi rst chapter examines the use of the notion of mercenaries in literature and in international treaties. It explores whether the defi nition laid down in international treaties, refl ect customary international law, or not. The second chapter of the study scrutinizes the various conditions listed in the afore-mentioned notions and tries to fi nd out whether and to what degrees private military companies and their employees meet them. The fi nal conclusion of this paper-of the perspective of international law-is that private military companies and their employees, in accordance with the rules of international law, cannot be considered mercenaries.
Introduction
"Mercenaries and auxiliaries are useless and dangerous; and if one holds his state based on these arms, he will stand neither fi rm nor safe; for they are disunited, ambitious and without discipline, unfaithful, valiant before friends, cowardly before enemies…" 1 -writes Machiavelli in his groundbreaking work, The Prince, giving substratum to numerous thinkers of contemporary international special literature, 2 who are concerned with the outsourcing of military activities. This clearly shows that the subject is critical and problematical in various relations. However, reality requires to unfold another side of the question, namely that "PMC-s do not follow the heritage of mercenaries. By national fi nancing they end such confl icts that must not unfold." 3 By taking this thought into consideration-besides that the topic is situated in various disciplines' (legal science, military science and security policy) scope-current study's aim is to investigate the applicability of the concept of mercenaries determined by international law in relation to private military companies and their employees. The fi rst part of the study focuses on the concept of mercenaries under the examination of literature and international law's contractual rules. Furthermore, it strives to answer the question whether the international legal concept of mercenaries is part of customary law or not. The second part studies the applicability of the concept's every element with regards to contractors.
In the study, the concepts of private military companies or PMSCs (private military and security company) mean enterprises with legal personalities, under employer or contractor we mean a natural person. Furthermore, all enterprises providing military or security service for supplying national duty are handled under the notion of private military companies. 4
Concept of mercenaries in literature and international law
When investigating that who and when can be regarded as a mercenary, we ought to be extremely careful, as the notions included in domestic and international literature consider those circles and people who fall within the scope of the notion wider than contractual and customary law of international law. They use wide enough notions in order to consider employees of private military companies as mercenaries. Therefore, it is not by chance that international media tends to mix contractors with mercenaries. 
The notion of mercenaries in literature
When clarifying the defi nition of mercenaries, we take a wider range of data, that is, the ideation of literature as a basis. The reason for this is that the subject of this investigation is a recent phenomenon connected to various disciplines and when analyzing it, it is practical to take theoretical defi nitions as a base. Hereby, the difference between theoretical ideation and international law regulating national practice can be emphatically highlighted.
In the broadest sense, those people may be regarded as mercenaries, who fi ght for fi nancial gain in foreign wars; they are primarily used by armed groups and occasionally by governments, as well. 6 It is clear that this notion's dominant element is the motive of gaining wealth, which makes the circle of people belonging to this group unduly wide. It needs to be narrowed down.
Laurie Nathan defi nes mercenaries as: people, who-in favour of money-serve a foreign country's army or a movement leading to an armed confl ict-whether participating directly in fi ghts or indirectly, by training, logistical assistance, secret agent activity or consultancy-and fall outside of the scope of authority of one's own country's government and protection. 7 Besides the motive of gaining wealth, independency from its army also plays part in it.
By further narrowing down the concept, according to Scott C. Goddard, we can regard that person or organization as mercenaries who (or which) is fi nanced to accomplish tasks within a foreign entity's military scope-also referring to participation in military-like action-without taking into consideration any kind of ideology, legal or moral obligation or rules of domestic or international law. 8 Compared to what has been previously stated, this concept points out to the amoral and illegal side of mercenaries' activity.
And fi nally, one of the most complex notions comes from Ervin Frigyes, who states that "Mercenaries are those people or groups of those people-united in different organizational units -who perform military (martial, military training, strategic and tactical planning, connected to martial weapons' maintenance and operation) activity without all kinds of ethnical, nationality, ideological or regional bonds, exclusively for material renumeration and are only motivated by fi nancial interests for any clients-who pays them out." 9 After listing the above notions we can state that everyone emphasizes fi nancial motivation as mutual element and surplus ones (for instance lack of ideology or illegal characteristics) are gathered under this concept. Employees of private military companies can be regarded as part of these notions without further investigation, hereby, they can be regarded as mercenaries. However, this could only be established with a superfi cial investigation. From humanitarian legal point of view, in case of an armed confl ict it is matter of life and death whether a person can be regarded as mercenary or not. Notions of literature cannot be seen as basic of labelling, therefore, we ought to closely examine the rules of international law. 13 The diplomatic conference, which was agreed in Additional Protocol I, was not unanimous as regards the notion of mercenaries. Some delegations favoured a short and simple defi nition of a mercenary, because of the danger that qualifi cations might empty the concept of any real meaning. Other delegations, by calling for an enumeration of the criteria for a mercenary and by noting that a) Is specially recruited locally or abroad in order to fi ght in an armed confl ict; b) Does, in fact, take a direct part in the hostilities; c) Is motivated to take part in the hostilities essentially by the desire for private gain and, in fact, is promised, by or on behalf of a Party to the confl ict, material compensation substantially in excess of that promised or paid to combatants of similar ranks and functions in the armed forces of that Party; d) Is neither a national of a Party to the confl ict nor a resident of territory controlled by a Party to the confl ict; e) Is not a member of the armed forces of a Party to the confl ict; and f) Has not been sent by a State which is not a Party to the confl ict on offi cial duty as a member of its armed forces.
Notion of mercenaries in international treaties
It emerges from the wording that in order to regard someone as a mercenary-therefore being able to part from combatants and civilians-one has to correspond to six conjunctive conditions. From this we can also conclude that if employees of private military companies do not correspond to even only one condition, they cannot be labelled as mercenaries, that is, they must be put in the category of combatants or civilians. However, we bump into a problem here, as employees of private military companies take place somewhere between these two categories and their international legal regulations are hardly satisfying. That is why they use "grey area" in international literature to describe operational area of contractors, as partly their operation is regulated and partly it operates freely. 14 The African Union Convention practically takes over the notion of Article 47 of Additional Protocol I word by word, and sets the same conjunctive terms for qualifying someone as a mercenary. 15 The application circle of the UN Convention is wider than that of the other two. This treaty created much wider and comprehensible notions. It labels two categories of people as mercenaries. The fi rst category corresponds to the above-mentioned criteria, except that the direct participation in fi ghts is not a condition. 16 According to the second criterion, a mercenary is also any other person, who in any other situation: a) Is specially recruited locally or abroad for the purpose of participating in a concerted act of violence aimed at:
i. As can be seen, we also talk about conjunctive conditions in this case as well, furthermore, in the case of point a) action must correspond to various conditions. The African Union Convention and the UN Convention go further compared to Additional Protocol I in the sense that they declare it illegal and punish mercenaries, their recruitment, training, fi nancial support, and employment. 17 However, it must be noted that in a UN Resolution from 1968 18 it was declared that employing mercenaries against movements for national liberation and independence is punishable as a criminal act and that the mercenaries themselves are outlaws. Furthermore, it calls upon the Governments of all countries to enact legislation declaring the recruitment, fi nancing and training of mercenaries in their territory to be a punishable offence and prohibiting their nationals from serving as mercenaries. The UN General Assembly further reconfi rmed it in 1973.
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Already in 1984, International Law Commission regarded mercenaries as an international crime to the extent that the way this practice aims at violating states' sovereignty and governments' stability and at prevention of national liberation movements, it means crime against Peace and Security of Mankind.
does not punish fi nancial support of foreign armed forces, and it can only be connected to supporting the opponent's state of affairs, if the fi nancial support materializes with the aim of weakening Hungary's military strength.
Based on investigating international treaties we can determine that in each of them, the defi nition of mercenaries is based on Additional Protocol I. They follow the same scheme; they list numerous conditions which all need to be met to label someone as a mercenary. 21 However, many states stayed away from the African Union Convention and the UN Convention-as we have previously mentioned-so the following question will be that whether we can regard the notion of mercenaries based on Additional Protocol I as customary law, hence, compulsory for each state.
Notion of mercenaries in international customary law?
According to the study be the International Committee of the Red Cross about international humanitarian customary law the notion of mercenaries written in Additional Protocol I is part of customary law these days. Pursuant to the Rule 108 mercenaries, as defi ned in Additional Protocol I, do not have the right to combatant or prisoner-of-war status. However, they may not be convicted or sentenced without previous trial. Arguments next to the customary-like nature of the notion of mercenaries can be convincing, as for the fi rst sight they can suggest that two elements of custom creation of law: "general practice" and "legal conviction", the opinio iuris sive necessitatis. However, the second element needs to be further examined, as beyond repetition, existence of conscience of legal obligation is also a condition.
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When listing the above-mentioned conditions, it may come into view that the United States of America has not been mentioned. The reason for this is that the USA did not ratify the Additional Protocol I, only signed it. However, based on Article 18 of Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969, states are obliged to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of a treaty, however, lack of ratifi cation by all means represents that the USA does not agree with the Additional Protocol I, or one of its regulations. Moreover, Deputy Legal Adviser of the US Department of State affi rmed that "we do not favor the provisions of article 47 on mercenaries, which among other things introduce political factors that do not belong in international humanitarian law, and do not consider the provisions of article 47 to be part of current customary law". 30 Based on this, the USA, as a persistent objector, based on its sovereignty, can pull itself out from the obligatory strength of general customary law, if we accept the customary nature of the notion of mercenaries.
In an opposite situation we do not even need to climb all of these steps.
However, it is not exclusively the USA which does not agree with what is being said in Article 47 of the Additional Protocol I and its custom-like characteristic. 31 When ratifying the Additional Protocol I in 1989, Algeria even attached interpretative declarations to the document. In it the country explains that the Government of the People's Democratic Republic of Algeria reserves judgement on the defi nition of mercenarism as set out in Article 47, para 2 of the present Protocol, this defi nition being deemed restrictive.
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Similarly to Algeria, Cuba attached a statement to the UN Convention, in which it explains that it does not agree with the notion of mercenaries-based on Additional Protocol I-defi ned in the Convention and will further stick to the notion defi ned in the 1988 Criminal Code.
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To summarize the above-mentioned pros and contras, we can say that the custom-like characteristic of mercenaries can be questioned. However, it does not reduce from the value of the notion written in Additional Protocol I; as it is an especially widely ratifi ed international treaty, which provisions are compulsory for member countries. As for further investigations, conceptual elements of Article 47 are the standard in contrary to wide and easy to shape notions of literature. Thus, hereinafter, we will investigate elements of Additional Protocol I; and will attempt to answer the question whether employees of private military companies can be included in this circle or not. 
International legal qualifi cation of private military companies and their employees
In the media private military companies are labeled by such pejorative attributes as "dogs of war", "mercenaries", "soldiers of fortune", moreover, these words are also used by professionals in order to describe armed contractors who guard VIPs, convoys, oil lines and other institutions in places like Iraq or Afghanistan. 34 This-and because of media incidents that worthily became well-known and notorious-they start to mix the notions of mercenaries and private military companies, in spite of the numerous differences between them.
However, it is signifi cant that activities of private military companies and outsourcing of national military tasks are not free from historical antecedents. In mainland the institution of "condottieri", at sea the institution of "privateer" spread between the 13-19 th centuries. Condottieri (meaning military employee) was the fi rst form of organised European private armies. Its ancestry dates back to the 14 th century Italy. 35 As a result of permanent military activities of knighthood that lost its privileges, a special system came into life, setting the art of armies into focus in armed confl icts and not the victory through sacrifi cing masses of soldiers. Condottieri practically formed a "military state". Their structure resembled of a perfectly organized business structure. 36 Condottieri, called by Sobek as "mercenary-enterprise" 37 hired lawyers and notaries in order to clarify legal questions and to word contracts. They also hired accountants and bankers in order to handle incomes more effectively, and to raise them through investments. Based on these, we can say that there's a certain similarity between modern private military companies and condottieri, regarding business structure. However, it is a ground difference that small a number of private military companies provide actual armed services.
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Privateers-which are mostly incorrectly translated as pirates-were people, who carried out their tasks on sea, with the authorization of a state. This authorization is called Letter of Marque. The fi rst charter was issued by Henry III, English ruler in 1243, well before forming the Royal Navy. 39 The charter was practically a national authorization for private entrepreneurs to hold supplies of enemies during war; however, privateers also proved to be useful in fi ghts against pirates or as a defensive unit, too. 40 European states more and more increasingly hired these entrepreneurs through the centuries; 41 43 The Declaration stated that privateering is, and remains, abolished.
Comparison of private military companies with mercenaries
The previous historical retrospection also revealed that entities similar to private military companies have already existed before and even then people tried to think of them as mercenaries. Training, hiring, fi nancing and recruiting of mercenaries is prohibited by international law, hereby, their activity is done in highest security. In opposition to this, advertising and publicity are essential conditions of private military company activities. It is signifi cant that they quasi also organised chambers in order to implement their self-regulation. 45 Mercenaries are smaller groups of individuals, so the individual characteristic dominates, in opposition to PMSCs, which are mainly organized business ventures with legal personalities. Mercenaries are usually citizens of a foreign state and many times gerillas, criminals and terrorists also become members. Most employees of PMSCs have served in national armies before, and they are chosen for missions from multinational database. Mercenaries mostly represent violent form of privatisation that is built from bottom to top (bottom-up), their contracting parties are usually not nations or armed groups who aim at undermining constitutional order in countries. PMSCs take part in violent privatisation that is organized from top to bottom (top-down)-their contracting parties are mainly governments or 44 The multinational companies, which mostly aim at improving reconstruction or strengthening inner order and safety. Mercenaries primarily take part in direct offensive activities, PMSCs only attend such tasks exceptionally, however, they carry out numerous other activities: training, professional guidance, military intelligence, counter-espionage, maintenance, logistic support, military support, military attendant support, or reconstruction after confl icts. Mercenaries-because of staying away from publicity-are used from black market and paid for in cash, PMSCs offer their services in public and enter into contracts with clients. National tasks are transacted via various application proceedings.
Are contractors the mercenaries of the 21st century?
When comparing private military companies with mercenaries, the difference that does not allow the two to be mixed can be clearly seen. However, from international legal perspective, further investigation of the question is necessary, and applicability of mercenaries that has previously been mentioned, needs to be further studied with regards to employees of private military companies. That is, elements of the notion of mercenaries have to be studied one by one, namely, a) their recruitment, b) direct participation in hostilities, c) motivation, d) nationality and place of residence, e) membership of the armed forces, as a negative element. a) Recruitment Based on Additional Protocol I, Article 47. para 2, African Union Convention Article 1. para. 1 and UN Convention Article 1. para. 1 that person can be regarded as a mercenary, who is specially recruited locally or abroad in order to fi ght in an armed confl ict. Based on the UN Convention Article 1. para. 2 that person also can be regarded as a mercenary, who is specially recruited locally or abroad for the purpose of participating in a concerted act of violence aimed at overthrowing a Government or otherwise undermining the constitutional order of a State; or undermining the territorial integrity of a State.
The wording of the treaties does not mention the recruiter, so it can even be a company which was entrusted by a state with supplying military or safety tasks in confl ict zones. Contracts between companies and employees almost always remain a secret, however, contracts between states and companies are many times public.
Companies of military services usually do not maintain greater permanent infrastructure, hereby, recruiting happens via various channels. There are international databases about possible people to be asked, private military companies publish their actual job offers even on their websites, or they draw on in-between companies. 48 These companies do the recruiting and training, they deliver the contractors to the confl ict zones on behalf of the employer. 49 Its outcome is an especially complicated, unperspicuous contractor -subcontractor structure, 50 which opens the door for misuse, in some cases, for violating human rights. Of course, sub-contractors have-respective to laws of their permanent residence's country-legal personalities. Independent legal personality excludes to call the "parent establishment" to account because of violation of law committed by its sub-contractors or its employees. 51 We can conclude from Karácsony Veronika's interview with contractors that entering into a contract, detailed and fi nal clarifi cation of condition usually takes place on the territory of the action, after having started the job.
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From one side, employees of private military companies consist of thousands of soldiers from general reduction of armies, on the other side, from strengthening fl ow of soldiers due to change for professional army. Besides previous soldiers, past employees of police and other violent services also become employees in increasing numbers. 53 However, this can be a problem, too. One UN Workshop called the attention to previous soldiers and policemen recruited to be "security men" who may become armed private soldiers in low intensity armed confl icts or in situations followed by confl icts. From international humanitarian law point of view, determining of direct participation has a crucial role, as direct participation is the base of demarcation between military and civil inhabitants. Members of a state's armed forces (except medical and ecclesiastical personnel) and members of organized armed forces can usually be looked upon as legitimate military targets, except if, they surrender or become unable to fi ght in any other ways. Civil people are usually defended from direct offenses, except if, and for that period when they directly participate in hostilities. 55 In spite of their signifi cance, neither international humanitarian law's contractual regulations, nor the practice of governmental or international courts defi ne exactly direct participation in fi ghts. So, in order to study this conceptual notion, general regulation in respect to international humanitarian law needed to be used, that is a treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose. According to the Recommendation IV of the Interpretive Guidance, "the notion of direct participation in hostilities refers to specifi c act carried out by individuals as part of the conduct of hostilities between parties to an armed confl ict."
58 Furthermore, the Interpretive Guidance clarifi es that this notion needs to be understood in the same way in connection to international and non-international armed confl icts as well.
In reality, direct participation in fi ghts can come true in various forms and intensity, so when judging whether the behaviour counts as direct participation, every possible circumstance, so characteristics of the given place and time are also needed to be examined during the process.
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Why is it so important to highlight that the notion of direct participation only refers to defi ned behaviours? Because extension outside of defi ned behaviours of the notion of direct participation would threaten the international humanitarian law's distinction between continuous protection of fi lled status and loss of temporary protection because of action.
In order to defi ne the relevant forms of behaviour, the Recommendation V provides help. "In order to qualify as direct participation in hostilities, a specifi c act must meet the following cumulative criteria:
1. the act must be likely to adversely affect the military operations or military capacity of a party to an armed confl ict or, alternatively, to infl ict death, injury, or destruction on persons or objects protected against direct attack (threshold of harm); 2. there must be a direct causal link between the act and the harm likely to result either from that act, or from a coordinated military operation of which that act constitutes an integral part (direct causation); and 3. the act must be specifi cally designed to directly cause the required threshold of harm in support of a party to the confl ict and to the detriment of another (belligerent nexus)." 60 Thus, three conjunctive conditions must meet in order to defi ne a stipulated behaviour as direct participation in hostilities: 1. causing mortifi cation, 2. direct cause-effect relation between behaviour and mortifi cation, 3. relationship between behaviour and hostility of parties to an armed confl ict.
As we have previously mentioned it in connection with recruiting, private military companies many times refer to that they only offer protective services and do not participate directly in hostilities. However, protection also counts as direct participation in fi ghts. International humanitarian law does not make any difference between offensive and defensive actions.
61 This is only the other side of a coin. For instance in Iraq, private military companies had the tasks of protecting military institutions, which, in case of military targets and armed fi ghts reaches the level of direct participation.
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Besides protective services, private military companies usually allude to that they only carry out preparatory activities, like arming, transportation, collecting information, etc. In this case the question is: when does direct participation in fi ghts begin?
According to the Interpretive Guidance's Recommendation VI, "measures preparatory to the execution of a specifi c act of direct participation in hostilities, as well as the deployment to and the return from the location of its execution, constitute an integral part of that act."
63 When judging direct participation, it is neither necessary, nor suffi cient that 1. a preparatory measure occur immediately before (temporal proximity) or 2. in close geographical proximity to the execution of a specifi c hostile act or that it be indispensable for its execution. confl ict, material compensation substantially in excess of that promised or paid to combatants of similar ranks and functions in the armed forces of that Party. Hence, this is also a conjunctive condition, too. Therefore, necessary are: 1.) individual desire for private gain, 2.) private gain must be promised by or on behalf of the Party to the confl ict and 3.) material compensation substantially in excess of that paid to soldiers in the armed forces. Article 1 para. 2 of UN Convention only supplements fi nancial motivation with a highly questionable attribute; it demands "signifi cant" personal profi t from mercenaries.
Previously, when reviewing literature notions, we noticed that fi nancial motivation as differentia specifi ca was highlighted by every author. In the case of international legal investigation of the notion of mercenaries, it is the same, too, as fi nancial motivation is the most crucial element of conceptual criteria laid down in treaties. This has already been highlighted during preparations of Additional Protocol I. 65 Financial motivation makes it possible to terminate mercenaries from volunteers joining armies, who are mostly not motivated by gaining wealth but by noble beliefs. 66 Although it is questionable whether we can terminate employees of private military companies from mercenaries, when we investigate their motivation.
Let us start with the fi rst part of the conceptual notion, the individual desire for private gain. One of the UN research groups arrived at the conclusion after their research that primarily motivation of military employees is gaining fi nancial wealth. 67 However, this does not need to be morally condemned, as great amount of private military company employees are recruited from developing countries or states with high percentages of unemployment. It further needs to be noted that gaining wealth is not an exclusive motivation. Desire for adventure, continuing military services (e.g. in case of vets) or simply proposition of doing something can mean nearly similar motivation. 68 During her research, Veronika Karácsony arrived at the conclusion that "previous soldiers and police men undertake jobs in private military companies because of professional improvement and gaining experience, or great cut-backs or constraint superannuations". 69 Based on these, we can talk about motivational mixture of private military company employees, in which gaining wealth is a signifi cant but not an exclusive element.
The second part refers to the origin of fi nancial remuneration as it must be promised by or on behalf of the Party to the confl ict. From theoretical point of view, this element is the least problematic one, as only the road of money needs to be backtracked, and if the fi ghting party can be found in the chain, this element comes true.
Finally, fi nancial remuneration must signifi cantly exceed the amount paid for soldiers of armed groups. They usually refer to that employees of private military companies signifi cantly earn more than equal members of armies. 70 The question is that whether employees of private military companies really partake in overpayment or not.
The question cannot be exactly answered, as great differences exist in payments of employees. According to Del Prado's research, employees can be organized into a hierarchical pyramid. At the top of the pyramid stand highly trained soldiers from the USA, who are the most greatly paid ones. Under them take place employees from Australia, United Kingdom, Canada and South-Africa, who are as well, greatly paid. On the third level we can fi nd the so-called third country members (e.g. Chile, Nepal, Peru, Honduras). Their payment is between 1000-3000 $ per month. At the bottom of the pyramid take place the locals (Iraq, Afghanistan), who are paid the worst. 71 If we strictly look at the payments of private military company employees in comparison to payment of soldiers who undertake similar tasks at an army, we can say that the difference is really signifi cant. In 2007, a private security man working at for instance Blackwater or DynCorp could even earn 1.222 $ per day (455.000 $ per year). In comparison, a warrant offi cer earned 140-190 $ per day (51-69.000 $ per year). 72 These numbers are only suitable for comparison at fi rst sight indeed, as the 1.222 $ is the billing rate, not the amount that is actually paid for employees. 73 Besides the employee's payment, billing rate also includes indirect charges of private companies, overhead charges, and profi t. 74 As a result of this, employees only get about quarter or fi fth of that amount which was paid for the private service by the contractor. 75 Finally, we have to ask the question that from what amount does payment of private military company employees exceed signifi cantly the amount paid for soldiers of armed forces. Based on our opinion, it is possible that some contractors meet the above-mentioned criteria, however, they can be parted from mercenaries when investigating motivational elements.
d) Nationality and place of residence Based on Article 47 para. 2 of Additional Protocol I, Article 1 para. 1 of African Union Convention and Article 1 para. 1 of UN Convention the fourth element of the notion of mercenaries refers to their citizenship and state of residence. Based on this, mercenaries are people, who are "neither a national of a Party to the confl ict nor a resident of territory controlled by a Party to the confl ict". Article 1 para. 2 of UN Convention does not broaden the notion for armed confl icts when it rules that someone counts as a mercenary in any other situation who is neither a national nor a resident of the State against which such an act is directed.
According to Louise Doswald-Beck, it is not at all clear whether this condition applies to the PMC's state of incorporation (in which case all its members would be treated as having that nationality) or the nationality of the individual member or both as private military companies did not mean a problem when the Additional Protocol I was accepted. 76 Based on the fourth element of the notion, besides that the aim they serve is acceptable by international law and morally, those who are citizens or residents of any of the fi ghting parties cannot be regarded as mercenaries. 77 This conceptual notion was highly criticised based on its applicability in case of private military companies, as it leads to a totally illfounded conclusion between citizens and residents of the fi ghting states and between citizens and residents of other states. 78 For instance: referring to the Afghanistan war, this conceptual notion excludes citizens and residents of the USA, Great Britain and Afghanistan from the notion of mercenaries, not employees from Honduras or Chile (only if they meet the other conditions).
According to the latest data, 113.376 contractors are employed in Afghanistan, out of which 30.568 are US citizens, 35.118 are citizens of a third state and 48.050 are citizens of Afghanistan. 79 This means that at least 70% of private military company employees in Afghanistan fall outside of the notion of mercenaries.
Besides, it often is a part of private military company contracts that their employees obtain the citizenship of the contracting state, hence, they also fall outside the international legal regime referring to mercenaries. 80 e) Membership of the armed forces Based on Article 47 para. 2 of Additional Protocol I, Article 1 para. 1 of African Union Convention and Article 1 para. 1 of UN Convention the fi fth element of the notion of mercenaries is membership of the armed forces of the fi ghting parties as a negative element. Hence, one can be regarded as a mercenary who is not member of the armed force of any of the fi ghting Parties; and has not been sent by a State which is not a Party to the confl ict on offi cial duty as a member of its armed forces. Article 1 para. 2 of UN Convention says similar, as based on this, a mercenary is a person who has not been sent by a State on offi cial duty; and is not a member of the armed forces of the State on whose territory the act is undertaken.
Employees of private military companies act not as individuals but as parts of that organisation which lead their activity. Furthermore Singer highlights that employees have responsibility for their bosses, who have contractual obligations for their employers. That is, when the employer is a state, private military companies quasi act as national deputies on international stage. 81 Moreover, Green calls upon that if the force that the mercenary offers his help to is an organised force, then mercenaries are most likely members of that organised force, and this also pulls it out from the notion of a mercenary. 82 It follows from this that we can regard private military employees as members of armed forces. This is also understated by the contract cited by Singer, which was made between Sandline International and Papua New Guinea, in which employees of private military services were named "special soldiers" and were looked upon as part of armed forces. 83 Which is even more signifi cant, PMSC so much integrated into US security system that in 2006, the US Department of Defense regarded them as "total force" in the Four-year Defense Investigation issued by the Department of Defence. According to the document, the Department of Defence is the greatest employer of the world, as it has more than 3 million direct employees. Parts of "total force" are Active Component, Reserve Component, civilians and contractors that is PMSCs.
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Conclusion
The aim of the study that we worded in the introduction was to demonstrate the applicability of international legal regulations in connection to mercenaries to private military services. The most signifi cant question was that whether we can put contractors under the notion of mercenaries with all of its consequences?
The answer to this question can be that every single element of the notion of mercenaries only comes true on very rare occasions. It is a conjunctive conceptual notion, so missing even one conceptual element makes the application of the rules to mercenaries impossible. As we noted in the study, the fi rst two elements (recruiting and direct participation in hostilities) are accomplished by the contractors. In case of motivation-not counting the pre-condemned complicated and hard questions of demonstration-there is a possibility to draw a line between employees of private military companies and mercenaries. Nationality and membership of the armed forces as negative criterion places most contractors outside the international legal concept of mercenaries.
As a conclusion we can say that employees of private military companies can be regarded as mercenaries only on the rarest occasions. However, this conclusion leads to another question, namely that if they cannot be regarded as mercenaries, then what rules apply to them from international legal point of view? Whether they are combatants, civilians or maybe something else?
